

Message Text

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ORIGIN L-03

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-07 ISO-00 ACDA-07 AGRE-00 AID-05
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DRAFTED BY: L/OES:BHOXMAN:MERS
APPROVED BY: S/AR:AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON
D/LOS:MR TAFT
DOD:COL FEDELE
EUR/CE:MR KURZE (INFOR)
EUR/NE:MR SHUMATE (INFO)
EUR/WE:MR DOBBINS (INFO)
EUR/SOV:MR MCCALL
EA/J:MR FEATHERSTONE
EA/IMS:MR KENNEY

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
INFO AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 081604

JAKARTA PASS ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOK

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 14 LINE 13 GARBLED)
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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PLOS

SUBJECT:LOS - US S.E. ASIA CONSULTATIONS

REFS: A) KUALA LUMPUR 2084; B) JAKARTA 4173;
C) LONDON 5201; D) KUALA LUMPUR 1938

1. SUMMARY. ACTION EMBASSIES ARE REQUESTED TO BREEF HOST

GOVERNMENTS IN CONFIDENCE ON AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON'S DISCUSSIONS, MAINLY ON STRAITS AND ARCHIPELAGOS IN SE ASIA. OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT BASIS EXISTS FOR SECURING AGREEMENT AT CONFERENCE ON STRAITS ARTICLES WITHOUT RPT WITHOUT SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENTS, AND ON ARCHIPELAGOS ESSENTIALLY AS DRAFTED PROBABLY WITH 50 MILE SEALANES. IN BOTH CASES, SUCCESS WILL DEPEND ON COOPERATIVE AND STRONGLY UNITED APHROACH OF MARITIME STATES WHICH, WE BELIEVE, CAN LEAD CONFERENCE TO OVERCOME REMAINING SCATTERED OPPOSITION. MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE THAT STRONG UNITED STAND ON STATUS OF ECONOMIC ZONE CAN PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT OVER CURRENT TEXT. THIS BRIEFING IS INTENDED AS FOLLOW-UP AND COLABORATION ON BRIEFING OF HOST GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES BY LEITZELL IN LONDON. END SUMMARY.

2. ACTION EMBASSIES ARE REQUESTED IN COURSE OF BRIEFING TO TURN OVER IN CONFIDENCE COPIES OF THE NOTES, DRAFT INTERPRETIVE STATEMENT, AND DRAFT AMENDMENT TO PART III, ARTICLE 42 GIVEN THE MALAYSIANS (REF A) AND A COPY OF JAKARTA JOINT PRESS STATEMENT (REF B), AS ONLY SOME OF THESE WERE PASSED BY LEITZELL.

3. AFTER CONSULTATIONS IN TOKYO, AMB. RICHARDSON AND TEAM (OXMAN, CLINGAN, TAFT, MORRIS, FEDELE) VISITED
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KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE, JAKARTA, AND CANBERRA. DISCUSSIONS IN FIRST THREE CENTERED ON STRAITS, WITH ADDITION OF ARCHIPELAGOS IN JAKARTA. PURPOSE OF VISIT WAS TO FOLLOW-UP EFFORTS OF OTHER G-5 MEMBERS IN TRYING TO SECURE AGREEMENT ON STRAITS WITHOUT SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT AND ON ARCHIPELAGOS, BOTH ON BASIS G-5 AGREED OBJECTIVES. KEY TO EFFORT WAS THEREFORE TO SECURE MALAYSIAN AGREEMENT THAT IT WOULD NOT PRESS ITS AMENDMENTS OR SEEK ESTABLISHMENT OF STRAITS NEGOTIATING GROUP, AND TO SECURE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE OTHER STATES IN THIS ARRANGEMENT. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT OPENING STRAITS ARTICLES TO SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE TO ACCOMMODATE MALAYSIAN COULD OPEN DOOR TO BROADER AND MORE FAR-REACHING ASSAULT ON THE TEXTS, WHICH IS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL TO AVOID.

4. DISCUSSIONS IN KUALA LUMPUR REVEALED THAT MINISTER KADIR'S PRINCIPAL CONCERN RELATED TO REGULATION OF TANKER TRAFFIC IN MALACCA STRAITS, PRIMARILY WITH RESPECT TO UNDER KEEL CLEARANCE (UKC) (MALAYSIAN DRAFT ARTICLE 40(A)). WHILE HE DESIRED UNILATERAL REGULATORY RIGHT, HE RECOGNIZED FIRM POSITION OF MARITIME POWERS THAT TRAFFIC REGULATIONS IN STRAITS MUST HAVE IMCO APPROVAL. DESPITE THIS, HE FELT IT WAS NOT CLEAR THAT TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEMES UNDER ARTICLE 39 COULD INCLUDE UKC

REGULATIONS, AND ACCORDINGLY THAT COASTAL STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS COULD INCLUDE THEM UNDER ARTICLE 40(1). MOREOVER, HE FELT THAT ARTICLE 40(2), PARTICULARLY THE SECOND PART OF THE SENTENCE, CAST FURTHER DOUBT ON THIS MATTER, DESPITE OUR ASSURANCES THAT THE TEXT IN CONTEXT WAS DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH HARRASSMENT AND ARBITRARY ACTION. IN ADDITION, HE REPEATEDLY RAISED THE PROBLEM OF ACTION TO PREVENT A VESSEL EXCEEDING THE UKC LIMITS FROM ENTERING THE STRAITS. KADIR RECOGNIZED THAT IF THE MARITIME POWERS WERE AGREED WITH THE STRAITS STATES ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE REGULATIONS, IMCO APPROVAL WOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL

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ASSURED. NEVERTHELESS, HE DID NOT WISH RESPECT FOR THE REGULATIONS TO BE DEPENDENT UPON MEMBERSHIP IN IMCO OR SOME OTHER TREATY, NOR DID HE WISH TO DELAY THE PROTECTION PENDING FINAL IMCO ACTION AND RATIFICATION OF THE LOS TREATY. AS TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE UKC LIMIT, HE NFIRMED THE FIGURE OF 3.5 METERS AFTER A REASONABLE TRANSITION PERIOD.

5. US MAINTAINED THAT SINCE UKC REGULATIONS WOULD REQUIRE IMCO APPROVAL, THERE WAS NO NEED TO AMEND STRAITS ARTICLES, AS THE ARTICLE 39 PROCEDURE APPLIED, AND ARTICLE 40(2) DID NOT PREVENT THEIR APPLICATION. IN AN ATTEMPT TO REASSURE KADIR, WE SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INTERPRETIVE STATEMENT JOINED IN BY APPROPRIATE MARITIME AND STRAITS STATES. WE PRESENTED HIM WITH A DRAFT, WHICH HOST GOVERNMENTS WILL NOTE ATTEMPTS TO SKIRT THE ENFORCEMENT QUESTION. KADIR IMMEDIATELY CAUGHT THIS, AND SAID HE COULD NOT AGREE THAT THE STRAITS STATES HAD NO RIGHT TO STOP A VESSEL EXCEEDING THE UKC LIMITS. HIS EXPERTS NOTED THAT IT WAS CONTEMPLATED THAT TANKERS ENTERING THE STRAIT WOULD RADIO A CENTER IN SINGAPORE, AND THAT IT WAS UNTENABLE TO AGREE THAT A TANKER EXCEEDING THE LIMIT COULD PASS.

6. USDEL WAS FACED WITH SITUATION IN WHICH IT WAS CLEAR THAT AGREEMENT RESULTING IN WITHDRAWAL OF MALAYSIAN AMENDMENTS COULD NOT BE REACHED WITHOUT ADDRESSING ENFORCEMENT QUESTION. WE CONSIDERED FOLLOWING FACTORS IN REACHING A CONCLUSION.

A. WE DID NOT WISH TO AMEND STRAITS ARTICLES, AND FELT MALAYSIAN PRESSURE WOULD RECEIVE STRONG SYMPATHY AT CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD RESULT IN FORMATION OF NEGOTIATING GROUP ON STRAITS IN COMMITTEE II, WHERE OTHERS WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SITUATION TO ERODE THE ARTICLES.

B. ARTICLE 40 AS DRAFTED IS AMBIGUOUS ON THE ENFORCEMENT
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POINT. WERE IT READY BY STRAITS STATES IN PRACTICE TO PERMIT ENFORCEMENT, (WHICH ON REFLECTION SEEMS TO US A QUITE PLAUSIBLE READING IN CONTEXT PARTICULARLY IN VIEW COASTAL STATE POLLUTION ENFORCEMENT POWERS BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL SEA UNDER PART III,) SHIPPING WOULD NOT RPT NOT HAVE THE PROTECTIONS OF SECTION VIII (SAFEGUARDS) OF PART III OF THE CONVENTION, BECAUSE OF THE DRAFTING OF ARTICLE 42 OF THAT PART.

C. EVEN IF THE STRAITS ARTICLES SURVIVED COMMITTEE II IN TACT, THE AMBIGUITY COULD CAUSE A REOPENING OF THE POINT IN THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE.

D. (MOSCOW SHOULD OMIT RPT OMIT THIS POINT.) THE MALAYSIANS TOLD US THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A MODIFIED VERSION OF ARTICLE 40A, AND WE KNEW KADIR WAS PLANNING TO VISIT MOSCOW IN MID-APRIL.

E. IN THE ABSENCE OF SOME UNDERSTANDING, THE STRAITS STATES MIGHT PROCEED TO IMPOSE THE REGULATIONS SOON UNILATERALLY, AND POINT TO ACQUIESCENCE IN FACT OVER TIME AS RECOGNITION OF THEIR AUTHORITY TO REGULATE PASSAGE UNILATERALLY, WITHOUT IMCO APPROVAL.

F. IF SECTION VIII OF PART III WERE APPLIED MUTATIS MUTANDIS TO STRAITS, WE WOULD STRONGLY LIMIT AND QUALIFY THE ENFORCEMENT POWERS OF STRAITS STATES.

G. A CHANGE IN PART III IS LESS RISKY THAN ONE IN PART II. ARTICLE 42 OF PART III WAS BEING SUBJECT TO ATTACK ANYWAY, AN AGREED CHANGE COULD DEFLECT THE ATTACKS OF EXTREMIST STRAITS STATES.

7. ON BASIS FOREGOING, WE PRESENTED MALAYSIANS WITH A DRAFT AMENDMENT TO PART III, ARTICLE 42. MINISTER KADIR SAID IT WAS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER MALAYSIA'S AMENDMENT
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TO THIS ARTICLE, AND MET HIS CONCERNS. WE DID NOT RPT NOT ELABORATE ON WHAT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS WOULD BE PERMISSIBLE IN LIGHT OF THE OTHER RELEVANT PROVISIONS.

8. NOTES ON THE STRAITS PACKAGE WERE PREPARED BY US AT THE MINISTER'S REQUEST. (THE POINTS ON VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE WERE DRAWN FROM OUR BRIEFING IN TOKYO.) MALAYSIA SAID IT WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT OTHER STRAITS STATES, AND WOULD CONSULT THE USSR DURING ITS FORTHCOMING VISIT. WE SAID WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT OTHER MARITIME STATES. KADIR SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT HE WOULD NOT PRESS MALAYSIAN AMENDMENTS TO STRAITS ARTICLE IF MARITIME STATES ACCEPT PACKAGE. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE WITH

AMB. RICHARDSON, MINISTER KADIR INDICATED THAT AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE WAS REACHED ON THE STRAITS PROBLEM, AND IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION SAID SPECIFICALLY THIS DID NOT RPT NOT MEAN AGREEMENT ON THE MALAYSIAN AMENDMENTS.

9. ON SCIENCE, MEMBERS OF THE G-5 RECOGNIZED THAT THE ABSENCE OF AN EQUIVALENT IN THE STRAITS CHAPTER TO ARTICLE 127 IN THE ARCHIPELAGO CHAPTER COULD BE READ AS HAVING AN UNINTENDED NEGATIVE IMPLICATION, WE FELT THAT APPROPRIATE STRAITS AND MARITIME STATES COULD RECOMMEND A TECHNICAL CLARIFICATION PRIVATELY TO THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEE II WITHOUT THE NEED FOR FORMAL ACTION OR DEBATE.

10. IN SINGAPORE, OUR TIME WAS LIMITED, AND WE DID NOT ILICIT A CLEAR REACTION ON THE STRAITS PACKAGE. SINGAPORE IS PREPARED TO BE HELPFUL ON THE STATUS OF THE ECONOMIC ZONE AND COMMITTEE I ISSUES.

11. INDONESIA. POSTS WILL RECALL THAT WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY PRESENTED STRAITS AND ARCHIPELAGOS AS A SINGLE PACKAGE TO THE INDONESIANS. MOREOVER, MINISTER MOCHTAR HAD INDICATED TO US AND OTHERS THAT THE PRIMARY PROBLEM

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ON STRAITS WAS MALAYSIA. THIS WAS REPEATED TO OUR AMBASSADOR TO INDONESIA WHILE WE WERE STILL IN KUALA LUMPUR. MOCHTAR REPEATED THIS THEME IN HIS WELCOMING REMARKS TO OUR DELEGATION. HOWEVER, WHEN HE LEARNED THE CONTENT OF THE KUALA LUMPUR STRAITS PACKAGE, HE REACTED NEGATIVELY, PARTICULARLY ON THE POINT OF KADIR'S DISCUSSING THE STRAITS STATE REGULATIONS AGREED IN MANILA AND THEIR SUBMISSION TO IMCO. IN THE COURSE OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS, AS WE STRESSED THE LINK TO ARCHIPELAGOS, MOCHTAR BACKED OFF SOMEWHAT, IN THE END CHARACTERIZING THE MOVE AS CONSTRUCTIVE, AND RESERVING JUDGMENT PENDING CONSULTATIONS WITH MALAYSIA. OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT UNLESS KADIR IS ENCOURAGED TO STICK WITH THE ARRANGEMENT BY OTHER MARITIME STATES, THERE IS A RISK THAT MOCHTAR MAY SUCCESSFULLY ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE KADIR TO CONTINUE PRESSING THE MALAYSIAN AMENDMENTS AS DRAFTED AND TO FORM A STRAITS NEGOTIATING GROUP AS A MEANS OF GAINING LEVERAGE ON THE MARITIME STATES.

12. WITH RESPECT TO ARCHIPELAGOS, BOTH SIDES WERE AGREEABLE TO USING AN AXIS CONNECTING FIXED POINTS TO DEFINE THE SEALANES, WITH VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT IN ARCHIPELAGIC PASSAGE PERMITTED UP TO A FIXED DISTANCE TO EITHER SIDE OF THIS AXIS, THEREBY REDUCING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE LANES DIVIDE THE ARCHIPELAGO. WE RESTATED OUR FORMAL POSITION ON BREADTH OF THE LANES AS 80 (40 TO EITHER SIDE) MILES, AND INDONESIA AS 20 MILES (10 TO EITHER

SIDE). BOTH SIDES CONFIRMED THAT THEY HAD HEARD RUMORS THAT THE DIFFERENCE IN FACT WAS BETWEEN 40(I) AND 60 (US) MILES. DURING DISCUSSION, WE GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT INDONESIA MIGHT AGREE TO 50 IF WE DID, OR AGREE TO TELL THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEE II THAT THE DIFFERENCE WAS BETWEEN 40 AND 60.

13. THE DISCUSSION REVEALED THAT THE FOLLOWING TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS COULD PROBABLY BE AGREED, SUBJECT TO CONSUL-
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TATION WITH OTHERS:

119(2) - 100 N.MILES/3 .

119(7) - AGREED INDONESIAN/MALAYSIAN TEXT.

124(1) - BEGIN TEXT: QTE SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 125 AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ARTICLE 122..

125(1) - AFTER QTE AIR ROUTES UNQTE ADD QTE THEREABOVE UNQTE.

125(3) - ADD QTE SOLELY UNQTE BEFORE QTE FOR THE PURPOSE UNQUOTE.

125(4) - SUBSTITUTE QTE ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS UNQTE FOR QTE ARCHIPELAGO UNQTE IN BOTH PLACES.

125(5) - REWRITE TO IDENTIFY SEA LANES AND AIR ROUTES BY AN AXIS, FROM WHICH MAXIMUM DEVIATION WOULD BE THE LESSER OF 25 MM OR 80 OF THE DISTANCE BETWEEN MAIN ISLANDS.

125(10) - REVISE TO READ QTE...CLEARLY INDICATE THE AXIS OF THE SEA LANES AND DEMARCATHE THE TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEMES.-.UNQTE.

126 - REPEAT THE TEXTS OF ARTICLES 38, 40 AND 42 (WITH CHANGES OF NOMENCLATURE, I.E. QTE TRANSIT PASSAGE UNQTE TO QTE ARCHIPELAGIC SEALANES PASSAGE UNQTE; QTE STATES BORDERING STRAITS UNQTE TO QTE ARCHIPELAGIC STATE UNQTE; QTE STRAIT UNQTE TO QTE ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS UNQTE).

14. THE MAIN PROBLEM PRESSED BY THE INDONESIANS WAS CIVIL OVERFLIGHT. IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY WISH TO IMPOSE THE SAME RPT SAME REGIME FOR AT LEAST SCHEDULED CIVIL AVIATION AS EXISTS ON LAND. IN OTHER WORDS, BILATERAL AGREEMENT WOULD
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BE NEEDED TO OVERFLY. THEY SAID THAT DENYING SCHEDULED

CIVIL OVERFLIGHT ONLY RPT ONLY TO A STATE THAT DENIED SUCH OVERFLIGHT TO THE CIVIL AVIATION OF THE ARCHIPELAGIC STATE WAS NOT RPT NOT ENOUGH. WE SAID WE HAD STRONG OBJECTIONS IN PRINCIPLE TO RESTRICTING TRANSIT (INCLUDING THE SPILLOVER TO THE STRAITS REGIME), AND THAT MOREOVER OTHER STATES COULD BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED, AND THEREFORE WE WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO AGREE. (ACTION POSTS SHOULD NOTE THAT SINGAPORE AND AUSTRALIA WOULD BE AFFECTED AND THAT THEY HAVE TENDED TO BE STRONG SUPPORTERS OF THE MARITIME STATES ON NAVIGATION ISSUES, AND THAT OPPOSING THEIR NAVIGATION RIGHTS WOULD SEEM TO BE UNWISE FOR THE MARITIME POWERS). THE INDONESIANS SAID THE USSR WAS AGREEABLE TO SOME KIND OF LANGUAGE ON THE ISSUE, BUT DID NOT PRODUCE IT. THIS SURPRISED US SOMEWHAT SINCE SOVIET SCHEDULED CIVIL AVIATION DOES OVERFLY CERTAIN PROSPECTIVE ARCHIPELAGOS.

15. WE REJECTED THE INDONESIAN PROPOSAL TO LIMIT OVER-FLIGHT OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO ALTITUDES SPECIFIED BY THE ARCHIPELAGIC STATE, STATING THAT THE ISSUE WAS NON-NEGOTIABLE. THE INDONESIANS THEN STATED THEY WOULD NOT PRESS POINT.

16. DJALAL SEEMED RPT SEEMED TO BE DROPPING HIS OBJECTION TO THE REQUIREMENT TO SUBMIT THE SEALANES TO IMCO FOR APPROVAL, AND THE REQUIREMENT THAT THEY INCLUDE QTE ALL UNQTE NORMAL ROUTES, AFTER WE SAID INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE MARITIME STATES IN NY ON THE ACTUAL ROUTES COULD ENSURE THAT THESE REQUIREMENTS WOULD NOT BE A PRACTICAL PROBLEM. WE SUSPECT THE INDONESIANS CONTEMPLATE FEWER ROUTES THROUGH THE ARCHIPELAGO (EG. 3) THAN DO THE MARITIME STATES.

17. WHILE WE WERE PREPARED TO AGREE THAT ARTICLE 126 COULD BE REPLACED WITH THE SAME RPT SAME SUBSTANTIVE TEXTS
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AS THE ARTICLES IT INCORPORATES BY REFERENCE, IT SEEMS MOCHTAR STILL DESIRES CHANGES IN SUBSTANCE DESIGNED TO INCREASE COASTAL STATE POWERS. WE POINTED OUT THAT THIS COULD HAVE THE POLITICAL EFFECT OF FORCING SIMILAR CHANGES IN THE STRAITS ARTICLES, AND THAT WE OPPOSED THE CHANGES BOTH IN SUBSTANCE AND BECAUSE WE ARE OPPOSED TO CHANGING THE STRAITS ARTICLES. WE ALSO REJECTED A PROHIBITION ON INNOCENT PASSAGE OF WARSHIPS OUTSIDE THE LANES, NOTING THAT IF NECESSARY THE ARCHIPELAGIC STATE COULD SUSPEND INNOCENT PASSAGE UNDER THE TEXTS.

18. IN PREPARING THE JOINT PRESS STATEMENT, AMB. RICHARDSON MADE CLEAR AGAIN THAT AGREEMENT ON STRAITS PASSAGE AND ARCHIPELAGIC PASSAGE WERE ESSENTIAL PARTS OF A PACKAGE RESULTING IN SUPPORT OF THE ARCHIPELAGIC PRINCIPLE.

19. AUSTRALIA. THE PRELIMINARY AUSTRALIAN REACTION TO OUR REPORTS SEEMED FAVORABLE. THEY ARE OPPOSED TO RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL AVIATION. THEY ARE PREPARED TO BE HELPFUL ON THE STATUS OF THE ECONOMIC ZONE AND COMMITTEE I ISSUES. (MOSCOW OMIT REPEAT OMIT NEXT SENTENCE). THEY WILL ALSO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO HELP ON SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH.

20. FOR LONDON AND PARIS. YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT AN INDO-NESEAN CIVIL AVIATION EXPERT MENTIONED CONCORDE IN PASSING REFERENCE WITHOUT EXPLANATION IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION OF OVERFLIGHT QUESTION.

21. EMBASSIES SHOULD URGE SUPPORT FOR APPROACHES OUTLINED ABOVE. IN PARTICULAR, AMEMBASSY MOSCOW SHOULD URGE SOVIETS TO RESIST AMENDMENTS TO STRAITS ARTICLES AND SUPPORT PACKAGE. WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO TRY TO ARRANGE SOME FURTHER EXCHANGE OR DIRECT DISCUSSION OF MATTER PRIOR TO KADIR VISIT TO MOSCOW IN EVENT SOVIETS WISH FURTHER EXPLANATION

OR ARE INCLINED TO DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW. IN ANY EVENT,
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WE WOULD APPRECIATE BRIEFING ON MOCHTAR AND KADIR VISITS TO MOSCOW. VANCE

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